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1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network ?WSN? is consisted of a 
large number of wireless-capable sensor devices working 
collaboratively to achieve a common objective. Nowadays, 
wireless sensor networks ?WSNs? have become a technology 
for the new millennium with endless applications ranging 
from civilian to military. As a matter of fact, WSNs are often 
deployed in potentially adverse or even hostile environments 
where adversaries can launch various kinds of attacks ?Wu 
?????. These attacks can disturb the deployment purpose 
of the WSN. How to defense against various kinds of the 
attacks is a very important issue for WSNs. 
In the area of computer science, Intrusion detection 
is a security technology that attempts to identify those 
who are trying to break into and misuse a system without 
authorization and those who have legitimate access to 
the system but are abusing their privileges. Recently, the 
problem of intrusion detection in WSNs has received 
considerable attention.
In current intrusion detection schemes of WSNs 
?Wu ????a, Khanna ????, Wu ????b, Yan ????, Yu ????, 
Sun ????, Su ????, Loo ????, Ngai ????, Paschalidis 
????, Rajasegarar ?????, two approaches have been 
used: signature-based detection and anomaly detection. 
Signature-based detection lies in the monitoring of system 
activity and the identification of behaviors which are 
similar to pattern signatures of known attacks or intrusions 
stored in a signature database. This category of intrusion 
detection systems ?IDSs? detects accurately known attacks, 
and the signatures are often generalized in order to detect 
the many variations of a given known attack. But this 
generalization leads to the increase of false positives ?i.e., 
false alarms?. The main limitation of such IDSs concerns 
their incapability to detect unknown intrusions that are 
not already present in the signature database. On the 
other hand, anomaly detection systems detect attacks by 
observing deviations from a pre-established normal system 
or user behavior. This approach makes detecting new or 
unknown attacks, if these attacks imply an abnormal use of 
the system. The main difficulty in the implementing reliable 
anomaly detection systems is the creation of the normal 
behavior model. Since it is difficult to define correctly these 
models and only incomplete or incorrect models can be 
obtained, which leads to false negatives or false positives.
The existing attack detection schemes can provide 
security for WSNs to some extent. However, the detection 
accuracy of most existing schemes is relative low, especially 
for defensing against unknown attacks. Sensor nodes 
usually have severe constraints in computational power, 
memory size, and energy. Because of those limited resources 
of WSNs, the existing intrusion detection schemes did not 
consider many effective security defense techniques, such 
as public key cryptography. Moreover, due to the limited 
memory in sensors, there are only few features that could be 
selected to detect intrusion. All the above facts can reduce 
the detection rate and enhance false alarm rate. 
Recently, in the intrusion detection community, interest 
has been growing applying machine learning techniques to 
get high performances in classification accuracy. Machine 
learning based intrusion detection for WSNs ?Yu ????? has 
gained limited attention so far. WSNs are usually deployed 
as a hierarchical structure. The nodes in different layer own 
different res ources. We further find hierarchical learning 
is an existing concept in the area of machine learning. The 
complexity of different kind learning is different. Based on 
the interoperation among the learning of different layer, 
the system can get a good tra deoff between efficient and 
accuracy. Hence, we consider design the attack detection for 
WSNs based on hierarchical learning.
Based on above discussion, it is clear that achieving 
intrusion detection with high accuracy using machine 
learning is still an open challenge in WSNs. In order 
to addressing this challenge, we proposed in this paper 
machine learning based efficient attack detection scheme. 
By exploring a brain-like two-layer learning model, we 
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propose a novel accurate attack detection scheme, which 
is specially tailored for WSNs. Our solutions have several 
advantages. First, our scheme is efficient in terms of storage, 
computation and communication overhead on the sensor 
side. Second, it has a significant impact on the accuracy of 
the intrusion detection due to the brain-like hierarchical 
learning architecture. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
? describes the system model and assumptions as well as 
some technical preliminaries on which our scheme is based. 
Section ? presents the proposed scheme in detail. Section 
? describes the wireless attack experiment through which 
we get the training and testing data set for evaluating our 
scheme. In Section ?, we evaluate our scheme in terms of 
efficiency and accuracy. Section ? analyzes related important 
features. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section ?.
2 Models and Assumptions 
2.1  Network Model
In this work, we consider a WSN with two-layer 
structure which includes base station layer, sink layer and 
sensor layer. This structure is a popular way for deploying 
WSNs. Usually each sensor can collect data and delivery 
the data to the sink or base station ?BS?. The resources of 
sensors are limited. However, the resources of sink and bases 
station are powerful.
2.2  Brain-like hierarchical learning
Recently, brain-like learning and computation has 
attracted a lot of attentions in the area of machine learning. 
In this paper, we consider the brain-like learning model in 
?Doya ?????, which is developed into a system structure 
in ?Hu ?????. This brain-like model is based on the fact 
that the cerebellum is a specialized organism for supervised 
learning ?SL?, the basal ganglia are for reinforcement 
learning ?RL?, and the cerebral cortex is for unsupervised 
learning ?UL?. In the framework, a particular function, 
such as the control of arm movement, can be realized by a 
global network combing different learning modules in the 
cerebellum, the basal ganglia, and the cerebral cortex. We 
design the related learning scheme for the sensor, sink and 
base station layers respectively, and base our design on the 
concept of brain-like hierarchical learning. 
Note that in this paper we use the supervised learning 
and unsupervised learning as a two-layer learning model in 
the brain-like learning fra mework.
3 Brain-like Two-layer Learning Attack Detection Scheme
3.1  Systemic Design
Considering the limited resources of sensors and the 
powerful resources of sink as well as base station, we define 
two levels of intrusion detection: ??? supervised learning 
based detection, and ??? unsupervised learning based 
detection. The supervised learning based detection is a low 
level detection which is performed in sensors. This part is 
corresponding with the cerebellum of the brain. On the 
other hand, the unsupervised learning based detection is a 
high level detection which is performed both in sinks and 
base station. This part is corresponding with the cerebral 
of the brain. If some unknown attacks occur to a sensor, 
the sensors will send the unknown features to the sink. 
This operation is marked as ?promotion?. Then the sink 
will determine whether the access is an attack or not by 
its high level rules. Then the sink sends the response to 
the sensor. In short, that sink and the base station perform 
intrusion detection by themselves. The sensor performs low 
level detection by itself, but it needs the help of sink for 
performing high level detection.
In this paper, for simplification of presentation, we 
assume that only one base station and several sink is in 
the WSN. In our scheme, we assume that sensors cannot 
communicate with base station directly. They can only 
communicate with base station via sink. For example, 
sensors can send unknown features to the sink, and then the 
sink sends back the detection results. However, the sensor 
can communicate with the sink which is in charge of the 
corresponding area.
Based on the basic idea above, a particular detection 
function can be realized by a global network combing 
different learning modules in sensor, sink and base 
station.
3.2  Supervised Learning based Intrusion 
       Detection in Sensor
Decision tree is a kind of classifier for supervised 
learning. Based on this kind of learning, we design the 
intrusion detection in sensors. The decision tree in our 
scheme contains three types of nodes: ordinary, leaf and 
promotion nodes. Each node is represented by N (A, D, 
M) where A is an attribute set, D is a set of detection rules 
and M is a set of countermeasure. The attribute set A 
Supervised learning
Sink or 
base station
Detection rules
Promotion/
Report
Response
Attack 
detection
WSN
Sensor
Unsupervised learning
Detection rules
Attack 
detection
Brain-like 
two-level 
structure
Fig. 1  Systemic design
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denotes the set of attributes already used to decompose the 
tree and D is the set of detection rules that are matched at 
that node. The initial root node contains the whole set of 
detection rules, an empty set of attributes and an empty 
set of matched rules. Then, we iteratively decompose each 
node according to the set of possible attributes using the 
appropriate inference rules. Leaves are nodes that cannot be 
transformed anymore. They can be used to report attacks 
thanks to the detection rules contained in their last field. A 
promotion node can be further processed by the sink as a 
root node of subtree.
Before we present our construction scheme, we define 
some notations and auxiliary functions employed in the 
decision tree construction scheme. 
Definition 1: Let T?{t?,t?,?,tk} be a set of criterion 
variable and d be a rule which is {?v? t? ??v? t? ???
?vk?tk?}. k is the dimension of T. We  define the function 
Drawn(d)?{v?, v?,?,vk}. The function can be extended to 
a set of rules D by 
( ) ( )
d D
Drawn D Drawn d
∈
= U
Definition 2: We define the function Obtain(N(A, D, 
M))?{Subtree| N?(A, D?, M?)?N?(A, D?, M?)…?Nm(A, 
Dm, Mm)}}. N?, N?,…,Nm are the member nodes of the 
subtree. This function send N(A, D, M) to a sink. Then 
N(A, D, M) can be further processed by the sink and a 
subtree will be returned to the sensor. The root node of the 
subtree is N(A, D, M), so that the subtree can be integrated 
with the current tree.
We use function Drawn to extract the parameters of 
the local rules, which are low level rules. Also, we use the 
function Obtain to get a subtree from the sink. In other 
words if the sensor cannot deal with some situations, the 
sink can help to decompose the current node N into a 
subtree based on high level rules. We assume that the root 
node of the tree has been selected. For each nonempty 
branch of the current node, we use the follow scheme to 
construct a decision tree.
The scheme of tree construction is shown in Fig.?. 
The process begins from an initial node N. The current 
node will become a leaf node if all the attributes have been 
considered. Otherwise, function Obtain will be used. When 
Obtain(N) function is performed, the connection point of 
the subtree and the parent tree is the current node N. Note 
that the parent tree is the decision tree in the sensor, and the 
subtree is generated in the sink. The rule set in the sensor is 
a subset of the rule set in the sink. All leaf nodes cannot be 
processed further. The construction process is stopped when 
all reduced nodes are leaf nodes.
3.3  Unsupervised Learning based Intrusion
       Detection in Sink and Base Station
As mentioned before, we have designed the supervised 
learning in sensor based on decision tree. In order to 
correspond with the learning scheme in sensors, we base our 
unsupervised learning on decision tree. 
At first we define a criterion of quality of the cluster. 
Assume the characteristic of a request from a user or an 
attacker is a data sample. All the samples consist of the 
data space. The decision tree with L leaves splits space of 
characteristics into L non overlapping subareas S?, S?,..., SL. 
This splitting space corresponds to the splitting of the set 
of observations samples into L subsets Sample1, Sample?, 
... , SampleL. Thus, the number of leaves in a decision tree 
coincides with the number of clusters. A cluster of samples 
is denoted as Samplei.
The description of this subset will be the following 
conjunction of statements:
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i
n nU Sample ,V X V X V X V= ∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ ∧ ∈L
where Vji is int erval of the sample space of the attacks, 
which is calculated by follows.
 
, or
where the previous equation is for quantitative characteristic, 
and the second one is for qualitative characteristic. 
Relative capacity ?volume? of characteristic subspace 
Analyze the feature set F and the 
rule sets D of the current node
Yes
Return N as a leaf node
No
Get a subtree from 
sink : Call Obtain(N)
Scan all the remainder 
nodes of the current 
parent tree
The tree can not grow?
No
Results
Yes
Start from an initial node N
Integrate subtree and 
parent tree through the 
promotion node
Return N as a 
promotion node
( ) ?Drawn D F⊆
Fig. 2  Decision Tree learning in sensor
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Ri can be calculated by
1
in
ji
j j
V
D
λ
=
=∏
where |Vji| denotes the length of an interval ?in case 
of the quantitative characteristic? or capacity ?number of 
values? of appropriate subset Vji ?in case of the qualitative 
characteristic?; |Dj| is the length of an interval between 
the minimal and maximal values of characteristic Xj 
for all samples from ini tial sample ?for the quantitative 
characteristic? or the general number of values of this 
characteristic ?for the qualitative characteristic?. Here 
initial sample means the samples space which has not 
been divided into the subspace by the learning algorithm. 
General number means the number which denotes the 
quantitative characteristics, because we use number to 
denote the quantitative characteristic for processing.
When the number of clusters is known, the criterion 
of quality of a cluster is the amount of the relative volume 
of characteristic subspace Ri:
1
L
i
i
g λ
=
=∑
If the number of clusters is not given beforehand, the 
next value as the criterion of quality is as follow,
= +P g aL
where ??? is a given parameter.
When minimizing this criterion, we receive the 
characteristic subspace of the minimal size. Meanwhile, we 
can aspire to reduce the number of characteristic subspaces. 
For the construction of a decision tree, the method of 
consecutive branching described in paragraph ?.? can be 
used. On each step of this method, a group of the objects 
corresponding to the leaf of the tree is divided into two 
new subgroups. The total volume of received characteristic 
subspace should be minimal. The node will be divided if the 
volume of the appropriate characteristic subspace is more 
than a given value. The division proceeds until there is at 
least one node for splitting or the current number of groups 
is less than the given number.
Note that learning mechanism in sink not only 
constructs decision tree for itself, but also decomposes the 
promotion node from sensor to construct a subtree for 
sensor.
3.4  Implementation System based on Agent
??? Technology
We use multi-agent to realize the function of intrusion 
detection in WSNs. There are four kinds of agents designed 
in WSNs, which are detection agent (DA), communication 
agent (CA), and database agent (BA). Figure ? shows the 
structure of the agent system of a node in wireless sensor 
network. DA is distributed in each node of the WSN. 
Detection agent (DA):
?? The Detection Learning Module (DLM) performs 
the learning algorithm described in section ?. The module 
acts as a classifier to perform intrusion detection. It 
implements the proposed supervised decision tree learning 
algorithm for sensor. For sink and base station, this module 
runs the proposed decision tree based cluster algorithm. 
?? The Detection Rule Module (DRM) contains the 
rule sets for intrusion detection. The rules are the choice of 
application design. The rules can be updated by the learning 
algorithm in the DLM.
Communication agent (CA):
This agent provides an interface for the node 
communicating with other nodes. Also, it pre-process the 
raw data into the format required by the data classification 
techniques. On one hand, this module acts an interface for the 
node interoperating with other nodes in WSNs. On the other 
hand, communication agent performs an interface to receive 
request and send responses for the user who accesses the node. 
Database agent (BA):
?? The History Module (HM) The History Module 
(HM) provides two distinct functionalities: a convenient 
mechanism to log events and actions that have occurred and 
an efficient mechanism to query these logged events. This 
module provides history data for detection learning.
?? The Attribute Module (AM) provides an interface 
for the detection agent (DA) to query and update attributes 
of the data and users.
Note that there are two cases of interoperation among 
the learning modules in different kind nodes in WSNs. 
These interoperations include promotion operation and 
report operation. The sequence of promotion operation of 
an access to a sensor is illustrated in Fig. ?. The sequence of 
report operation is similar with that of the promotion.
In Fig. ?, the sequence model of promotion operation 
can be described in ? steps:
Step?: The legal or illegal user sends an access request 
the sensor. 
WSN node
Detection 
learning
Detection  agent
Communication 
agent
History Attribute
Database agent
Detection
 rule
Fig. 3  Node model of agent system
7GITS/GITI Research Bulletin ????-????
Step?: The communication agent in the sensor receives 
the access request and pre-processes the request data and 
transfer the notification to the corresponding detection 
agent in the sensor. 
Step?: The detection agent looks up the features of the 
request based on the rules in the existing decision tree using 
supervised learning.
Step?: If the features match the rule of the existing 
decision tree, the communication agent sends an access 
response to the user. 
Step?: If there are unknown features which do not 
match the rule of the decision tree, the sensor will start the 
promotion process and send the features of the unknown 
access to the sink.
Step?: The communication agent in the sink receives 
the parameters of the promotion operation and then pre-
processes them. 
Step?: The communication agent in the sink transfers 
the notification of the promotion operation to corresponding 
detection agent in the sink.
Step?: The detection agent in the sink performs the 
unsupervised learning based on the new features of the 
access and the communication agent send back the results 
of the unsupervised learning to the sensor.
Step?: The detection agent in the sensor update the 
decision tree structure and make decision based on the new 
decision tree.
Step?: The communication agent in the sensor sends 
the response of the unknown access to the user.
4 Wireless Attack Experiment and Data Set
In this section, we report the attack experimentation, 
through which we can get the data set for training and 
test. Because many existing WSNs are deployed by IEEE 
???.?? and Mote devices technologies, we use IEEE ???.?? 
based wireless link for our experiment. Moreover, for access 
control, a role-based access control ?RBAC? policy is used.
Feature selection is an important issue for intrusion 
detection. In order to enhance the detection accuracy 
for the attack from different layers, we consider both 
the application layer features and MAC layer features to 
construct the data set. We combine the features of access 
control and ???.?? wireless traffics to construct the feature 
data set. On one hand, we select the important features 
of access control. On the other hand, according to IEEE 
???.?? standard, the fields of the MAC header can be 
extracted. We used the Information Gain Ratio ?IGR? 
?Quinlan ????? as a measure to determine the relevance 
of each feature. We can order the features according to the 
score assigned by the IGR measure. The IGR measure is 
based on the data set of frames collected from our testing 
network. The features of access control and ???.?? traffics 
which we used for experiment are shown in Table ? and 
Table ? respectively. The number of the selection features 
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Fig. 5.  Time overhead in sensor
Table 1  Features of Access Control
Order Features Description
? LoginResult Access decision results before access.
? NumbWr Number of write operation on access control fi les.
? NumbCrea Number of create operation on rule fi le.
? NumbAccess Number of access.
? NumbDe Number of delete operation on access control fi les.
Table 2  Features of Traffic
Order Features Description
? WepResult Th e result of WEP ICV check.
? Duration Th e time the medium is expected to be busy
? More_Frag Whether a frame is  non final fragment or not.
? Desti_Addr Th e MAC address of the receiving node.
? Fram_Type Th e type of the frame.
? IfRetransmit If the frame is a retransmitted frame.
? Sour_Addr Th e MAC address of sending node.
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depends on the requirements of security and the resources 
of the system. As a case study for resource-constrained 
WSNs, we select ? access control features and ? traffic 
features of ???.?? for test.
We did the attack experiment in an ???.?? network. 
We take ARP replay attack, forgery attack, ongoing 
dictionary attack, chopchop attack, which are the common 
attacks in ???.?? networks, as the examples for evaluation. 
The tool we use to generate attacks is Backtrack, which is 
available from the website ?Backtrack ?????.
In our experiment, the network was composed of three 
wireless stations. We use one machine as a server node 
?access point?. Then, we use another machine to generate 
normal traffic firstly and later attacks. The last machine 
was used to collect and record both normal and intrusion 
traffic. The number of related records in the data set is 
shown in Table ?. There is no training set for chopchop 
attack, because we use this attack as unknown attack for 
test. The other three kinds of attacks can be regarded as 
usual attacks.
5 Evaluation and Comparisons
5.1 Time and Memory Overhead in Sensor
Usually the resources of sensor are limited, but the 
resources of sink and base station are powerful. Hence, the 
evaluation of sensor is crucial and typical. We focus on 
the time overhead and memory consumption caused by 
our scheme on sensor. We have implemented our scheme 
for TinyOS and tested it using TOSSIM. The mote that 
TOSSIM simulates is MicaZ.
Moreover, the number of cluster is unknown in the 
experiment.
There are two phases of the learning, training phase 
and test set. Before the sensors being deployed, the training 
process can be performed on some other well-resourced 
devices, such as laptop, because the resources of sensors are 
limited. Hence, the initial detection rules can be constructed 
on well-resourced devices and then loaded into sensors. In 
this paper, the initial detection rules training is based on the 
training data set in section 
Based on the above reasons, we just focus on the test 
phase. We evaluate the average overhead of every test data 
sample. The average overhead caused by the proposed 
scheme and related schemes during detection is reported in 
Fig. ?, which is the time needed by a sensor from receiving 
a request to making a local detection decision. 
As shown in Fig. ?, the time overhead caused by the 
proposed scheme is lower than that of the Yan?s and Yu?s 
schemes. The results show that detecting unknown attacks 
usually need more time than detecting known attack. 
Loading the rules intrusion detection requires 
memory. The memory consumption of our scheme is an 
important measure of its feasibility and usefulness on memory 
constrained sensor nodes. The memory consumption is 
shown in Table ?. Because MicaZ has ??? KB of instruction 
memory and ??? KB of flash memory, the experiment results 
means that the proposed scheme leaves enough space in the 
mote?s memory for user applications. On the other hand, the 
memory consumption of Yan?s and Yu?s are ????? Bytes and 
????? Bytes. Our scheme shows the advantage on memory 
consumptions on sensor.
Note that for the sensor, the subtree for chopchop 
attack get from the sink is ???? Bytes.
5.2  Communication Overhead
The proposed scheme can cause communication 
overhead into WSNs. In a WSN, the number of sensor is 
usually much more than that of sink and base station, and 
some sensors usually are deployed far from base station 
and sink. In other words, the communication overhead 
is mainly caused by sensors. Hence, we focus on the case 
that the attacks occur to sensors. Figure ? depicts the 
communication cost of the proposed scheme measured in 
overhead packets in WSNs. 
As shown in Fig. ?, the communication overhead in 
Table 3  Data Set
Traffi  c type Training set Test set
ARP replay attack ??? ???
Forgery attack ??? ???
Ongoing dictionary attack ??? ???
Chopchop attack ? ???
Normal ???? ????
Table 4  Memory Consumption in Sensor
Agent Size?Bytes?
Detection agent ?????
Database agent ?????
Communication agent ????
Total ?????
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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case of unknown attack is higher than that in case of known 
attack, because the sink needs to return a subtree to the 
sensor in case of unknown attacks. The communication 
overhead also depends on the number of hop from the 
intruded sensor to the sink.
5.3  Detection Rate
The evaluat ion of  the accuracy of  detect ion 
was  obta ined us ing Mat lab and NeuroSolut ions 
?NeuroSolutions, ?????. The detection accuracy of the 
proposed scheme depends on the learning algorithm in sink 
and base station, because ?promotion? operation exists in the 
low level detection in sensor. 
We use a metrics to evaluate the attack detection 
performance, namely, detection rate q. The detection rate is 
formally defined by
q = d/n
where d is the number of detected attacks, and n is the total 
number of actual attacks.
The false alarm rate measures the percentage of 
false positives among all normal traffic events. A formal 
definition is given by
/m kη =
where m is the total number of false positive alarms and k is 
the total number of connection event.
For evaluating the accuracy of detection, the training 
and test data are the data set in section ?. The experiment 
results of detection rate and the comparison with Yan?s as 
well as Yu?s schemes are shown in Fig. ?. 
Fig. ? shows the experimental results of false alarm 
rate of detection. Comparing with Yan?s and Yu?s schemes, 
the detection false alarm rate of our scheme is ?.? and ?.? 
percentages lower respectively. 
6 Analysis
In ou r scheme, the same point between sink and base 
station is that both the sink and base station can perform 
the high level intrusion detection using unsupervised 
learning algorithm. However, there is different point 
between sink and base station. Sink node not only perform 
the high level detection itself, but also perform the high 
level detection for the sensors which is covered by the sink.
Feature selection is a very important for reducing the 
number of  characteristic subspaces. In this paper, we just 
select some important features of the traffic and access 
control, which is refer to the related papers. We think how 
to further reducing the number of characteristic subspaces 
is an important future work. The given n value for the 
volume of the appropriate subspace depends on the features 
selection and the classification accuracy of the learning 
algorithm.
In WSNs, the resources of sensors are limited, and the 
resources of sink and base station are powerful. Therefore, 
we focus the time overhead of sensors in our evaluation. 
Because only related simple supervised learning algorithm 
is performed as low level detection in sensors, which has 
lower complexity than Yan?s and Yu?s schemes. Therefore, 
in Fig.?, the time overhead caused by the proposed scheme 
is lower than that of Yan?s and Yu?s schemes. 
On the other hand, in our scheme, the detection rate 
depends on the high level detection. We use unsupervised 
learning to perform the high level detection, which can deal 
with complex samples. Therefore, our scheme has higher 
detection rate than Yan?s and Yu?s schemes.
In the evaluation, because we just use chopchop attack 
as the unknown attack, only one promotion operation is 
performed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the important security issue 
of accurate intrusion detection in WSNs. In order to resolve 
this problem, we proposed the brain-like tow-layer learning 
based attack detection scheme, in which the sensor, sink/
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base station perform different kinds of learning algorithms 
and interoperate optimally with each other. Referencing 
to the brain-like hierarchical learning model, we designed 
a relatively sim ple decision tree learning algorithm in 
the sensor for low level intrusion detection, which is 
corresponding with the supervised learning of cerebellum. 
Then, we proposed a decision tree based clustering 
mechanism in sink/base station for intrusion detection, 
which has a correspondence with unsupervised learning of 
cerebral cortex. Through combing and connecting different 
learning modules in the sensor, the sink and the base station 
as a global network, the function of distributed attack 
detection can be realized. The implementation system of the 
proposed scheme is designed based on the agent technology. 
Our evluation based on the attack experiment shows that 
the proposed scheme has several advantages in terms of 
efficiency of implementation, high detection rate. Although 
we assume in this paper that WSNs is deployed through the 
three-layer architecture, the proposed scheme can also be 
applicable for the WSNs deployed in two-layer architecture, 
which only includes base station and sensor. This is because 
based on our model the sensor can interoperate directly 
with base station for promotion operation.
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